Interesting article by Clyde Prestowitz over at Foreign Policy continuing with the "economics of defence" and the rise of China theme by drawing attention to a little-noticed strategy that came out at about the same time as the defence guidance.
"At the moment, four great incentives are continuing to pull the production and provision of tradable goods and services out of the United States. These are foreign currency manipulation that overvalues the dollar, subsidization by many foreign governments of the offshoring of U.S. production capacity, the "buy national" policies and attitudes of many governments that force U.S. companies (and the corporations of other countries) to produce in a particular country if they want to sell there, and the subsidization of and risk reduction for capital investment by state-owned or indigenous private companies in designated "strategic" or "pillar" industries by a number of foreign governments. As long as the report doesn't even mention these elements, let alone address them, there is no hope for a shift in the downward arching American economic, industrial, and technological trajectory."
For the UK, trading with the rest of the world is even more important to the country's well being (the UK doesn't have the US's huge internal market). MP Kwasi Kwarteng, who has a Cambridge doctorate in economic history, offered this take a while ago on government's role in promoting manufacturing and trade. Acknowledging that it's a little surprising to hear a Conservative MP take positively about government support for the private sector, Kwarteng ends with this.
"Of course, we can’t mention the P-word, Protection, in polite company, but everyone is doing it. They always have. Once we recognise this, we realise that it makes sense to harness our excellent universities and scientists and our manufacturing traditions to preserve and grow our industrial base. Nothing could be more conservative than that." - Flashman would be proud!
As ever, Londonstani finds it difficult to resist a little econ geekery
There are many, many people more qualified to talk about last week's US defense strategic guidance than Londonstani (particularly a certain East Tennessean). From a UK perspective, what struck Londonstani was the similarities, and differences, to the UK defence strategic review last year.
(Well, that and the fact that the US is talking about "savings" that would swallow the total UK annual defence budget several times over)
Differences:
1 - The US's review was actually strategic, in that it addressed a changing environment (Chinese power and Arab Spring) and how to re-position itself in order to address it.
2 - Related to the first point, the US is talking about alliances with new powers (ie India) to help it achieve its aims.
Similarities included:
1 - The fact it's supposed to save money
2 - The rebalancing away from the infrastructure of large-scale deployments to more special operations type stuff.
There was also a third - slightly more stretched - similarity. Both US and UK approaches to defence in the future include significant elements that you wouldn't - strictly speaking - consider to be in the "defence" sphere of government. The US talks quite specifically about India serving its economic (and therefore security) aims in the region. While the UK version spoke of a £3.8 billion increase in aid from the development budget.
So it that sense, Londonstani feels, its definitely a good thing that foreign/defence matters are taken out of their boxes and looked at in their wider context - in terms of causes, effects and potential solutions.
Actually, China itself provides a useful example.
Londonstani has spent the last 2-1/2 years being based out of Pakistan, which - in case anyone missed it - is a key Chinese ally on the quiet. Sometime before that, Londonstani spent a fair amount of time living and reporting from Sudan - another Chinese ally. (In fact, one project involved looking exclusively at China's role in fueling the Darfur conflict)
In both cases, China's influence is due to its economic clout rather than its military strength. In both cases, wealthy decision makers in the host country do personally well out of the alliance. (Londonstani once met with an ex-Pakistani official who used to work at a regulatory body who was aghast at how a recent trade pact with China was potentially ruinous for the country but was passed because of the pockets it would line in Pakistan.)
The point here is that Chinese influence will not go away, in fact it will probably grow, but that in itself will probably cause challenges for China itself. In Pakistan for example, a market increasingly tied up by China, consumers murmur about the inflated prices and low quality of the goods they get.
For the US, and even more so for the UK, meeting the challenge will involve doing business in places like Pakistan, engaging publics and projecting soft power (particularly relevant to the guidance's point on the Arab Spring). This will involve more than than one department of government, and a number of non-government actors.
As a little aside, Londonstani can't resist mentioning Paul M. Kennedy's comment in his The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery*:
"For maritime strength depends, as it always did, upon commercial and industrial strength: if the latter is declining relatively, the former is bound to follow. As Britain's naval rise was rooted in its economic advancement, so too its naval collapse is rooted in its steady loss of economic primacy. We have come full circle."
Londonstani is particularly gratified to see discussion of something he and his friends used to talk about when he worked in Cairo. "The Mubarak's", the joke went, "think the world smells of fresh paint."
"Especially in her later years, Suzanne observed Cairo’s garbage-strewn streets through a gilded peephole. For her, walls were scrubbed, flowers planted, grass grown, Egyptians bribed to smile. If you were part of the royal convoy, Cairo was clean and Egyptians were happy."
Londonstani can attest that when Gamal Mubarak visited his office, the entire building got a makeover. When the president and his wife made the drive to parliament, flowers were planted on the sides of the road. Only to be dug up again after they passed.
So it seems it always is after a dictator falls, everyone suddenly has that 'Emperors New Clothes' moment. "How did they get away with it for so long?", "Why did the international community support them?" etc etc.
One thing that Londonstani suspects is being covered in the Egyptian Arabic press and blogs (the guys at www.arabist.net might be able to comment on that), but not so far in Western media, is how the Mubarak regime convinced ordinary Egyptians to support them.
There was nothing mediocre about the way the regime exploited Egyptians' own sense of pride and linked it to the figure of Mubarak through the clever use of media, the state education system and the manipulation of Egypt's recent history.
Egyptians older and far savvier than Londonstani have pointed out that the Mubarak branding machine was far more successful than that of his republican predecessors. Pre-2003, Mubarak faced a lot less direct criticism than Sadat or even Nasser, the Pan-Arab hero.
Mediocre they might have been, but they were doing something right (relatively speaking).
Anyway, read the whole article and ponder where you would lay the blame for the world's toleration of Egypt's three-decade long catastrophe.
* Major big up to Mandy Fahmy credited at the bottom of the article, who Londonstani has no doubt is responsible for securing the awesome sources.
Common sense suggests that Pakistan's problem's are not about to solved by a saviour who gathers them all up squashes them into a little (cricket?) ball shape and hurls them into the sun. Making things better is going to take groups of people with new ideas and approaches, supported by similarly minded people with the resources, taking legitimacy from an even bigger group of people who support what they are doing.
"An exciting shift is now under way in Pakistan: the young are becoming politically engaged. In coffee shops, beauty salons and workplaces, instead of gossiping or deconstructing the latest televised drama, youngsters are arguing about the merits of various politicians. As a journalist, I can’t walk into a social gathering without getting grilled by my peers and their younger siblings about this policy or that. Older Pakistanis who have long bemoaned the apathy of the country’s educated, middle-class youth are sighing in relief at this newfound activism. As one elderly family friend put it, “Your lot has finally woken up.”"
Huma makes the point that Imran Khan has benefited from (or perhaps sparked) this awakening of interest among the young, but this is part of a bigger trend.
"Several social media sites have hosted online voter-registration drives for the 2013 general elections. Many of these are not affiliated with any political party; they are simply seeking to boost youth participation at the polls. Pakistan’s mainstream political parties, the Pakistan Peoples Party (P.P.P.) and the Pakistan Muslim League-N (P.M.L.N.), are launching youth-oriented campaigns and showcasing a new generation of politicians. Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, of the P.P.P., is encouraging private media outlets to emphasize youth-oriented programming. The opposition leader Nawaz Sharif, who heads the P.M.L.N., recently drafted a new strategy to revamp his party’s Facebook presence and, in a bid to entice young voters, promised to distribute 300,000 laptops to students if he is elected."
Pakistan is a young country with a tumultuous history, and as such the era you were born into has a big impact on your outlook to life, culture, your view of the outside world and politics.
What Londonstani finds really interesting about all this is that there is evidence to suggest Pakistan's under 35 year old majority approach life in a very different way to their elders. The impact of social media, mass communication and migrations all have their place, but there is an even more elemental level to this. For examle, someone who grew up being told to fear a Hindu-dominated Alll-India government will approach things differently to someone who's lived their whole life secure in the "Muslimness" of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
Londonstani's work recently involved researching the views of Pakistani young people. The picture that emerged was of a huge body of people who are more confident in their identities as Pakistanis, less interested in ethnic backgrounds, more questioning of received logic, less fearful of India and much more keen on travel and engagement with the outside world. The study was limited and much more work should be done looking at this area, but, for Londonstani, it was well summed up by one of the interviewees:
"The most influential person in my life? Well, I should say my father. But, he often talks very forcefully about a subject and then I look online or ask my friends and find out he doesn't have that much information."
The reality is that life in Pakistan at all levels is dominated by men who are typically over 45 (this, of course, includes Imran). Whether military, religious ideologues, feudal landlords, business moguls or media magnates, they do things in very similar, patriarchal ways. The political parties' scramble to get young people involved is an effort to direct the inevitable trend. (The young generation the parties are promoting are often sons and daughters of the leaders).
Huma makes the point that she is not talking about a Pakistani version of the Arab Spring; "Unlike their counterparts in the Arab world, young Pakistanis are less inspired by revolutionary rhetoric than in producing results through the existing system. They are demanding issue-based politics."
This in itself is a revolution.
If you want to see what sort of people Huma is talking about, watch Al Jazeera's documentary on Ali Abbas Zaidi:
And while you're at it, check out rapper Adil Omar:
Oh, and of course Co-Ven
** oops, I wrongly cited the writer of the original piece as Huma Imtiaz when it was in fact Huma Yusuf. This has been fixed apols to both Humas.
If you follow Pakistan with any degree of interest, chances are you've heard a lot about Imran Khan. If the press coverage is to be believed, the former cricket captain carries the hopes of the entire nation - particularly the young (who form the majority of the population) - on his shoulders.
There's little doubt that there is something different about the support Imran is getting. In Pakistan, votes are usually bought (one way or another), so it is rare to see a politician earning genuine support. But more than that, the buzz building up around Imran would be rare in any political arena, anywhere in the world. In the words of US political campaign strategists, Imran is transitioning from "politician" to "movement".
But don't let the likes of this cloying cinematic tribute
lead you to think that Pakistanis are waiting in frenzied awe to be led by "the Kaptaan".
Some of the best analysis of Imran's plans and fortunes has been done by Pakistani writers and bloggers. (The FT's editor in comparison couldn't resist trading in a proper interview for the chance of playing an over against one of the world's best fast bowlers)
The most popular criticism levelled against Imran by observers in Pakistan (and a fair few abroad) is that his populist stance panders to the fundamentalist fringe.
"...allow me to say that Imran’s view on foreign policy, and in particular the war against the Taliban, are legitimately dangerous. His views completely miss the point of what the threat is, where the threat is coming from, and what can be done about it."
Observers and friends of Pakistan in the West find it difficult to imagine Imran - who himself was once roughed up by Islamist student thugs - could be sympathetic to right-wing, reactionary politics. If the observers in question happen to be over 30 and from a cricket-playing nation, the idea that Oxford-educated, "playboy Imran" is courting people whose idea of Pakistan's best interests involves wars with India and the United States produces a serious bout of cognitive dissonance.
It could be argued that politicians in Pakistan think that looking the other way to a bit of sabre rattling is little different to US politicians saying silly things to avoid looking "soft on national security". However, over at Pak Tea House Yasser Hamdani, a supporter of Imran's Pakistan Tehreek Insaaf party (PTI), articulates the fear of many that this rightwing bent of mind translates to a position on the wrong side of THE core issue in Pakistani politics; the status of the military.
"...I feel threatened rather by a certain line of thinking – a line of thinking that still believes that the military has a role to play in Pakistani politics, that ISI and GHQ should hold a veto against corrupt politicians, and that some how the Pakistan Army is defender of some arbitrary ideological frontier of the country. Sadly many of our fellow travellers in the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf also subscribe to this view."
Hamdani's is a cry for Pakistan's best political prospect to affirm the principle upon which he is building up the hopes of millions. For Hamdani, as for many Pakistanis concerned about the future of their country, a brighter tomorrow is not possible as long as the present alignment of power exists.
"The truth is that so long as this mindset prevails, no political leader no matter how well intentioned or honest will be able to dent the systemic failure which affects the democratic process in this country."
Nasir Jamal, writing for the impressive Herald magazine, takes the PTI and Imran to task for failure to grapple with any deep thought on the problems facing Pakistan.
Nasir quotes the party's secretary general, Dr. Arif Alv as saying, “Our agenda is the agenda of Pakistan. It is all in the newspapers. Everybody knows what the issues are."
"At a mundane level, why is PTI so reluctant to provide details of its programme?" asks Nasir.
Alvi responds, “We are not releasing the details because we do not want others to steal our programme, cut it and paste it as their own.”
Really? Cut and paste?
Nasir goes on to sketch out why the simple, generalised auntie-uncle logic* doesn't address Pakistan's serious issues.
Running with the secretary general's newspapers reference, Nasir makes the point that "Khan’s answers to complex economic, political, social and strategic problems seem to come straight from the opinions and editorials pages of newspapers and television talk shows. He wants to make Pakistanan energy-surplus and self-reliant economy by exploiting the country’s natural resources. That these natural resources require money, technology and elaborate political, administrative and environmental measures does not seem to matter."
Nasir points to the promise of solving the energy crisis as an example, "For instance, most of Pakistan’s natural gas and coal reserves happen to be in Balochistan and Sindh and after the 18th amendment to the constitution no federal government can extract and use them without the consent of the provincial governments. Does Khan propose to bypass such constitutional niceties, risking further distrust between the provinces and the centre or will he be willing to take the long and painful route of creating a national consensus on how to extract and use these natural resources for the common good of the country?"
To press the point home, Nasir goes on to complain about Imran's habit of quoting statistics and figures that seem to be plucked from thin air and using them to back up impressive sounding claims built on flimsy logic.
He quotes Imran as saying; "Pakistan loses 3,000 billion rupees (about $33 billion) annually to corruption and in unpaid taxes; if we succeed in stopping this loss (to the revenue) we can turn the economy around, woo fresh investment and achieve self-reliance."
Nasir adds, "In an undocumented economy like Pakistan, it is difficult to say if his statistics are authentic but even if they are correct, doing something about them will help Pakistan only balance its budget — something that may be one of the many factors in an economic turnaround but cannot on its own put the economy on the right track. What about current account deficit, foreign loans, international and regional trade and, most importantly, a level playing field and an enabling environment?"
(As a former Reuters reporter, Londonstani can't resist a bit of rigorous economics)
Perhaps most worryingly, and related to the core problem of the military's role in the country, Nasir suggests Imran has a problem with the concept of causality:
"Khan pledged to remove the sense of alienation among the Baloch but did not say anything on the role of the military and bureaucratic establishment in creating this alienation, just as he did not touch the civil-military relations which lie at the core of many political crises that Pakistan has faced in the recent past."
But let's say Imran develops some serious policies as the elections start rolling round, the next stumbling block, says former ambassador Zafar Hilaly, is getting Pakistani officialdom to turn policies into actions.
"the one instrument for implementing policy, the civil services, is in complete disarray. Just about every human ill afflicts them. Corruption and “speed money” and people who delight in doing nothing and to say “nothing can be done” abound... The bureaucrats will resist change and innovation. They will find “a difficulty for every solution” and they know how to take “good ideas and then quietly strangle them to death... Merely tweaking the way the bureaucracy works will not do."
But despite all the gaps and questions, there's a deep desire welling up in Pakistan for Imran Khan to take the reins of the country. Hilaly sums up the desperation from which it springs:
"..in our peculiar circumstances Imran offers a better prospect than the others. To the desperate masses he brings hope and, even if his performance falls short... in the end we have to make a choice based on what we have on offer and backing Imran Khan is a risk I am prepared to take."
When Imran and his party colleagues are assessing their political fortunes, it would serve them well to remember that the support he is building is the thin wedge of a deep well of despair. Maybe soon, Pakistan's least-worst hope needs to stop trying to be all things to all Pakistanis. Pakistan has a long way to go and maybe Imran can push it in the right direction, but that won't happen until he answers this fundamental question posed by his own supporter:
"You cannot speak of a progressive Pakistan and also send a note to Jammat-ud-Dawa (the suspected LeT front) rally in Lahore. You cannot, on the one hand, rightly condemn Mumtaz Qadri (Salmaan Taseer's killer) and then have Ejaz Chaudhry (a party official) represent you at the free Qadri rally. Imran Khan, please choose, so that we may also not be under illusions about anything."
*"auntie-uncle logic" is Pakistan's equivalent to the UK's "taxi driver logic". Both are refined arts that rest on the proponent's ability to offer opinions in a manner that is inversely related to their lack of knowledge. The Pakistani version of this all too popular art form derives its name from the actions of older relatives - often the most advanced practioners.
Londonstani